Kitap 5
10.74
Or from contradictions: He who is wise is not a fool. Or from consequences necessary or probable It is possible that Quintilian regards adiuncta as = consequentia. The distinction made above is that made by Cicero, Top. xii. : If justice is a good thing, we must give right judgment : If breach of faith is a bad thing, we must not deceive. And such arguments may also be reversed. Similar to these are the following arguments, which must therefore be classed under this same head, since it is to this that they naturally belong: A man has not lost what he never had : A man does not wittingly injure him whom he loves : If one man has appointed another as his heir, he regarded, still regards and will continue to regard him with affection. However, such arguments, being incontrovertible, are of the nature of absolute indications. See ch. ix.
10.75
These, however, I call consequent or ἀκόλουθα goodness, for instance, is consequent on wisdom: while in regard to things which merely have taken place afterwards or will take place I use the term insequent or παρεπόμενα, though I do not regard the question of terminology as important. Give them any name you please, as long as the meaning is clear and it is shown that the one depends on time, the other on the nature of things.
