Kitap 9
4
It seems that what we are describing is not a particular thing, but a definite material; e.g., a box is not wood, but wooden material,Cf. Aristot. Met. 7.7.10-12. and wood is not earth, but earthen material; and earth also is an illustration of our point if it is similarly not some other thing, but a definite material—it is always the latter term in this series which is, in the fullest sense, potentially something else.
5
E.g., a box is not earth, nor earthen, but wooden; for it is this that is potentially a box, and this is the matter of the box—that is, wooden material in general is the matter of box in general, whereas the matter of a particular box is a particular piece of wood.
5
If there is some primary stuff, which is not further called the material of some other thing, this is primary matter. E.g., if earth is made of air, and air is not fire, but made of fire, then fire is primary matter, not being an individual thing.
6
For the subject or substrate is distinguishable into two kinds by either being or not being an individual thing. Take for example as the subject of the attributes man, or body or soul, and as an attribute cultured or white. Now the subject, when culture is induced in it, is called not culture but cultured, and the man is called not whiteness but white; nor is he called ambulation or motion, but walking or moving; just as we said that things are of a definite material.
