Kitap 8
4
And since the essence is substance, and definition is the formula of the essence, we have therefore systematically examined definition and essential predication.Cf. Aristot. Met. 7.4-6, 12, 15. And since the definition is a formula, and the formula has parts, we have been compelled to investigate parts, and to discover what things are parts of the substance, and what are not; and whether the parts of the substance are also parts of the definition.Cf. Aristot. Met. 7.10, 11. Further, then, neither the universal nor the genus is substance.Cf. Aristot. Met. 7.13, 16.
5
As for the Ideas and the objects of mathematics (for some say that these exist apart from sensible substances) we must consider them later.Books 13 and 14. But now let us proceed to discuss those substances which are generally accepted as such.
5
Now these are the sensible substances, and all sensible substances contain matter.
6
And the substrate is substance; in one sense matter (by matter I mean that which is not actually, but is potentially, an individual thing); and in another the formula and the specific shape (which is an individual thing and is theoretically separable); and thirdly there is the combination of the two, which alone admits of generation and destruction,Cf. Aristot. Met. 7.8. and is separable in an unqualified sense—for of substances in the sense of formula some are separableIn point of fact the only form which is absolutely separable is Mind or Reason. Cf. Aristot. Met. 12.7, 9. and some are not.
