Kitap 8
6
Some matter is intelligible and some sensible, and part of the formula is always matter and part actuality; e.g., the circle is a plane figure.Even formulae contain matter in a sense (intelligible matter); i.e. the generic element in the species. Plane figure is the generic element of circle. But such thingThe highest genera, or categories. as have no matter, neither intelligible nor sensible, are ipso facto each one of them essentially something one; just as they are essentially something existent: an individual substance, a quality, or a quantity. Hence neither existent nor one is present in their definitions. And their essence is ipso facto something one, just as it is something existent.
7
Hence also there is no other cause of the unity of any of these things, or of their existence; for each one of them is one and existent not because it is contained in the genus being or unity, nor because these genera exist separately apart from their particulars, but ipso facto.
8
It is because of this difficulty that some thinkersThe Platonists. speak of participation, and raise the question of what is the cause of participation, and what participation means; and others speak of communion; e.g., LycophronA sophist, disciple of Gorgias. says that knowledge is a communion of the soul with knowing; and others call life a combination or connection of soul with body.
