Kitap 8
11
For either it is not a unity but a kind of aggregate, or if it is a unity, we must explain what makes a unity out of a plurality. And the definition is a unity; but similarly they cannot explain the definition either. This is a natural consequence, for the same reason applies to both, and substance is a unity in the way which we have explained, and not as some thinkers say: e.g. because it is a kind of unit or point; but each substance is a kind of actuality and nature.
12
Also (d) just as a number does not admit of variation in degree, so neither does substance in the sense of form; if any substance does admit of this, it is substance in combination with matter.In Aristot. Categories 3b 33-4a 9 Aristotle does not allow this exception.
12
Let this suffice as a detailed account of the generation and destruction of so-called substances, in what sense they are possible and in what sense they are not; and of the reference of things to number.
1
As regards material substance, we must not fail to realize that even if all things are derived from the same primary cause, or from the same things as primary causesi.e. from prime matter or the four elements.; i.e. even if all things that are generated have the same matter for their first principle, nevertheless each thing has some matter peculiar to it; e.g., the sweet or the viscous is the proximate matter of mucus, and the bitter or some such thing is that of bile— although probably mucus and bile are derived from the same ultimate matter.
