Kitap 7
5
Or again, why are these things, e.g. bricks and stones, a house? Clearly then we are inquiring for the cause (i.e., to speak abstractly, the essence); which is in the case of some things, e.g. house or bed, the end , and in others the prime mover—for this also is a cause. We look for the latter kind of cause in the case of generation and destruction, but for the former also in the case of existence.
6
What we are now looking for is most obscure when one term is not predicated of another; e.g. when we inquire what man is; because the expression is a simple one not analyzed into subject and attributes. We must make the question articulate before we ask it; otherwise we get something which shares the nature of a pointless and of a definite question.
7
Now since we must know that the fact actually exists, it is surely clear that the question is why is the matter so-and-so? e.g. why are these materials a house? Because the essence of house is present in them. And this matter, or the body containing this particular form, is man. Thus what we are seeking is the cause (i.e. the form) in virtue of which the matter is a definite thing; and this is the substance of the thing.
7
Clearly then in the case of simple entitiesPure forms which contain no matter; in their case the method just described obviously will not apply. They can only be apprehended intuitively (cf. Aristot. Met. 9.10.). inquiry and explanation are impossible; in such cases there is a different mode of inquiry.
