Kitap 7
7
If we hold this view, it follows that matter is substance. But this is impossible; for it is accepted that separability and individuality belong especially to substance. Hence it would seem that the form and the combination of form and matter are more truly substance than matter is.
8
The substance, then, which consists of both—I mean of matter and form—may be dismissed, since it is posterior and obvious. Matter too is in a sense evident. We must consider the third type, for this is the most perplexing.
8
Now it is agreed that some sensible things are substances, and so we should begin our inquiry in connection with these.
2
It is convenient to advance to the more intelligiblesc. by nature. All learning proceeds by induction from that which is intelligible to us (i.e., the complex facts and objects of our experience, which are bound up with sensation and therefore less intelligible in themselves), to that which is intelligible in itself (i.e., the simple universal principles of scientific knowledge).; for learning is always acquired in this way, by advancing through what is less intelligible by nature to what is more so. And just as in actions it is our task to start from the good of the individual and make absolute good good for the individual,Cf. Aristot. Ethics 1129b 5. so it is our task to start from what is more intelligible to oneself and make what is by nature intelligible intelligible to oneself.
