Kitap 7
7
If we look at the question from this standpoint it is obvious that no universal attribute is substance; and it is also clear from the fact that none of the common predicates means so-and-so, but such and-such. Otherwise amongst many other awkward consequences we have the third man. See note on Aristot. Met. 1.9.3.
8
Again, it is clear in this way too. Substance can not consist of substances actually present in it; for that which is actually two can never be actually one, whereas if it is potentially two it can be one. E.g., the double consists of two halves—that is, potentially; for the actualization separates the halves.
9
Thus if substance is one, it cannot consist of substances present in it even in this sense, as Democritus rightly observes; he says that it is impossible for two to come from one, or one from two, because he identifies substance with the atoms.Cf. Aristot. De Caelo 303a 6, Aristot. De Gen. et Corr. 325a 35.
10
Clearly then the same will also hold good in the case of number (assuming that number is a composition of units, as it is said to be by some); because either 2 is not 1, or there is not actually a unit in it.
11
The consequence involves a difficulty; for if no substance can consist of universals, because they mean of such a kind, and not a particular thing; and if no substance can be actually composed of substances, every substance will be incomposite, and so there will be no formula of any substance.
