Kitap 7
5
If then a sphere is the figure whose circumference is everywhere equidistant from the center, part of this will be the medium in which that which we produce will be contained, and part will be in that medium; and the whole will be the thing generated, as in the case of the bronze sphere. It is obvious, then, from what we have said, that the thing in the sense of form or essence is not generated, whereas the concrete whole which is called after it is generated; and that in everything that is generated matter is present, and one part is matter and the other form.
6
Is there then some sphere besides the particular spheres, or some house besides the bricks? Surely no individual thing would ever have been generated if form had existed thus independently.If forms are self-subsistent substances, individual substances cannot be generated from them; for the individual contains the form, but one substance cannot contain another actually existing substance (Aristot. Met. 7.8.8). Form, however, is not a substance but a characteristic. Form means of such a kind; it is not a definite individual, but we produce or generate from the individual something of such a kind; and when it is generated it is an individual of such a kind.
7
The whole individual, Callias or Socrates, corresponds to this bronze sphere, but man and animal correspond to bronze sphere in general.
