Kitap 7
11
Hence essence will belong to nothing except species of a genus, but to these only; for in these the predicate is not considered to be related to the subject by participation or affection, nor as an accident. But of everything else as well, if it has a name, there will be a formula of what it means—that X belongs to Y; or instead of a simple formula one more exact—but no definition, nor essence.
12
Or perhaps definition, like the what, has more than one sense. For the what in one sense means the substance and the individual, and in another each one of the categories: quantity, quality, etc.
13
Just as is applies to everything, although not in the same way, but primarily to one thing and secondarily to others; so what it is applies in an unqualified sense to substance, and to other things in a qualified sense. For we might ask also what quality is, so that quality also is a what it is; not however without qualification, but just as in the case of not-being some say by a verbal quibble that not-being is—not in an unqualified sense, but is not-being—so too with quality.
14
Now although we must also consider how we should express ourselves in each particular case, it is still more important to consider what the facts are. Hence now, since the language which we are using is clear, similarly essence also will belong primarily and simply to substance, and secondarily to other things as well; just as the what it is is not essence simply, but the essence of a quality or quantity.
