Kitap 5
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(2.) The senses of essential being are those which are indicated by the figures of predicationThe categories. For the full list of these see Aristot. Categories 1b 25-27.; for being has as many senses as there are ways of predication. Now since some predicates indicate (a) what a thing is, and others its (b) quality, (c) quantity, (d) relation, (e) activity or passivity, (f) place, (g) time, to each of these corresponds a sense of being.
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There is no difference between the man is recovering and the man recovers; or between the man is walking or cutting and the man walks or cuts; and similarly in the other cases.
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(3.) Again, to be and is mean that a thing is true, and not to be that it is false.
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Similarly too in affirmation and negation; e.g., in Socrates is cultured is means that this is true; or in Socrates is not-white that this is true; but in the diagonal is not commensurableCf. Aristot. Met. 1.2.15.is not means that the statement is false. (4.) Again, to be 〈or is〉 means that some of these statements can be made in virtue of a potentiality and others in virtue of an actuality.
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For we say that both that which sees potentially and that which sees actually is a seeing thing. And in the same way we call understanding both that which can use the understanding, and that which does ; and we call tranquil both that in which tranquillity is already present, and that which is potentially tranquil.
