Kitap 4
8
and definition results from the necessity of their meaning something; because the formula, which their term implies, will be a definition.Cf. Aristot. Met. 4.4.5, 6. The doctrine of Heraclitus, which says that everything is and is not,Cf. Aristot. Met. 4.3.10. seems to make all things true; and that of AnaxagorasCf. Aristot. Met. 4.4.28. seems to imply an intermediate in contradiction, so that all things are false; for when things are mixed, the mixture is neither good nor not-good; and so no statement is true.
1
It is obvious from this analysis that the one-sided and sweeping statements which some people make cannot be substantially true—some maintaining that nothing is true (for they say that there is no reason why the same rule should not apply to everything as applies to the commensurability of the diagonal of a squareA stock example of impossibility and falsity; see Index.), and some that everything is true.
2
These theories are almost the same as that of Heraclitus. For the theory which says that all things are true and all false also makes each of these statements separately; so that if they are impossible in combination they are also impossible individually. And again obviously there are contrary statements, which cannot be true at the same time. Nor can they all be false, although from what we have said, this might seem more possible.
