Kitap 4
39
And if all men are equally right and wrong, an exponent of this view can neither speak nor mean anything, since at the same time he says both yes and no. And if he forms no judgement, but thinks and thinks not indifferently, what difference will there be between him and the vegetables?
39
Hence it is quite evident that no one, either of those who profess this theory or of any other school, is really in this position.
40
Otherwise, why does a man walk to Megara and not stay at home, when he thinks he ought to make the journey? Why does he not walk early one morning into a well or ravine, if he comes to it, instead of clearly guarding against doing so, thus showing that he does not think that it is equally good and not good to fall in? Obviously then he judges that the one course is better and the other worse.
41
And if this is so, he must judge that one thing is man and another not man, and that one thing is sweet and another not sweet. For when, thinking that it is desirable to drink water and see a man, he goes to look for them, he does not look for and judge all things indifferently; and yet he should, if the same thing were equally man and not-man.
42
But as we have said, there is no one who does not evidently avoid some things and not others. Hence, as it seems, all men form unqualified judgements, if not about all things, at least about what is better or worse.
