Kitap 4
12
(for we do not identify having one meaning with being predicable of one subject, since in this case cultured and white and man would have one meaning, and so all things would be one; for they would all have the same meaning). And it will be impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, except by equivocation, as e.g. one whom we call man others might call not-man;
13
but the problem is whether the same thing can at once be and not be man, not in name , but in fact . If man and not-man have not different meanings, clearly not being a man will mean nothing different from being a man; and so being a man will be not being a man; they will be one.
14
For to be one means, as in the case of garment and coat, that the formula is one. And if being man and being not-man are to be one, they will have the same meaning; but it has been proved above that they have different meanings. If then anything can be truly said to be man, it must be two-footed animal; for this is what man was intended to mean.
15
And if this is necessarily so, it is impossible that at the same time the same thing should not be two-footed animal. For to be necessarily so means this: that it is impossible not to be so. Thus it cannot be true to say at the same time that the same thing is and is not man.
