Kitap 3
10
Hence just as, if the elements of languageOr letters of the alphabet. Cf. Aristot. Met. 1.9.36n. were limited in number, the whole of literature would be no more than those elements—that is, if there were not two nor more than two of the same 〈so it would be in the case of existing things and their principles〉.For the answer to the problem see Aristot. Met. 12.4-5, Aristot. Met. 13.10.
11
(ix.) There is a difficulty, as serious as any, which has been left out of account both by present thinkers and by their predecessors: whether the first principles of perishable and imperishable things are the same or different. For if they are the same, how is it that some things are perishable and others imperishable, and for what cause?
12
The school of Hesiod, and all the cosmologists, considered only what was convincing to themselves, and gave no consideration to us. For they make the first principles Gods or generated from Gods, and say that whatever did not taste of the nectar and ambrosia became mortal—clearly using these terms in a sense significant to themselves;
13
but as regards the actual applications of these causes their statements are beyond our comprehension. For if it is for pleasure that the Gods partake of them, the nectar and ambrosia are in no sense causes of their existence; but if it is to support life, how can Gods who require nourishment be eternal?
