Kitap 3
7
But it is impossible for either Unity or Being to be one genus of existing things. For there must be differentiae of each genus, and each differentia must be onei.e., each differentia must have Being and Unity predicated of it.; but it is impossible either for the species of the genus to be predicated of the specific differentiae, or for the genus to be predicated without its species.The reasons are given in Aristot. Topica, 144a 36-b11. Hence if Unity or Being is a genus, there will be no differentia Being or Unity.
8
But if they are not genera, neither will they be first principles, assuming that it is the genera that are first principles. And further, the intermediate terms, taken together with the differentiae, will be genera, down to the individuals; but in point of fact, although some are thought to be such, others are not. Moreover the differentiae are more truly principles than are the genera; and if they also are principles, we get an almost infinite number of principles, especially if one makes the ultimate genus a principle.
9
Moreover, if Unity is really more of the nature of a principle, and the indivisible is a unity, and every thing indivisible is such either in quantity or in kind, and the indivisible in kind is prior to the divisible, and the genera are divisible into species, then it is rather the lowest predicate that will be a unity (for man is not the genussc. but the species. of individual men).
