Kitap 14
3
If all things must share in number, it must follow that many things are the same; i.e., that the same number belongs both to this thing and to something else. Is number, then, a cause; i.e., is it because of number that the object exists? Or is this not conclusive? E.g., there is a certain number of the sun’s motions, and again of the moon’s,5 in each case, according to Aristotle; cf. Aristot. Met. 12.7.9, 11. and indeed of the life and maturity of every animate thing. What reason, then, is there why some of these numbers should not be squares and others cubes, some equal and others double?
4
There is no reason; all things must fall within this range of numbers if, as was assumed, all things share in number, and different things may fall under the same number. Hence if certain things happened to have the same number, on the Pythagorean view they would be the same as one another, because they would have the same form of number; e.g., sun and moon would be the same.Cf. previous note.
