Kitap 14
9
This thinker means by the not-being which together with Being makes existing things a plurality, falsity and everything of this naturePlat. Soph. 237a, 240; but Aristotle’s statement assumes too much.; and for this reason also it was saidPresumably by some Platonist. that we must assume something which is false, just as geometricians assume that a line is a foot long when it is not.
10
But this cannot be so; for (a) the geometricians do not assume anything that is false (since the proposition is not part of the logical inferencei.e., the validity of a geometrical proof does not depend upon the accuracy of the figure.), and (b) existing things are not generated from or resolved into not-being in this sense. But not only has not-being in its various cases as many meanings as there are categories, but moreover the false and the potential are called not-being; and it is from the latter that generation takes place—man comes to be from that which is not man but is potentially man, and white from that which is not white but is potentially white; no matter whether one thing is generated or many.
11
Clearly the point at issue is how being in the sense of the substances is many; for the things that are generated are numbers and lines and bodies. It is absurd to inquire how Being as substance is many, and not how qualities or quantities are many.
