Kitap 13
14
sect. 14, 15 have no counterpart in Book 1.And if we profess that in all other respects the common definitions apply to the Forms, e.g. that plane figure and the other parts of the definition apply to the Ideal circle, only that we must also state of what the Form is a Form, we must beware lest this is a quite meaningless statement.The suggestion is that the definition of an Ideal circle is the same as that of a particular circle, except that it must have added to it the statement of what particular the Idea is an Idea.
15
For to what element of the definition must the addition be made? to center, or plane or all of them? For all the elements in the essence of an Idea are Ideas; e.g. animal and two-footed. sc. in the definition or essence of Ideal man. Further, it is obvious that being an Idea, just like plane, must be a definite characteristic which belongs as genus to all its species.i.e., being an idea will be a characteristic common to all ideas, and so must be itself an Idea.
1
This chapter corresponds almost verbally to Aristot. Met. 1.9.9-15. Cf. note on Aristot. Met. 13.4.6.Above all we might examine the question what on earth the Ideas contribute to sensible things, whether eternal or subject to generation and decay; for they are not the cause of any motion or change in them.
