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Empedocles theory is also absurd, for he identifies the Good with Love.Cf. Aristot. Met. 1.4.3. This is a principle both as causing motion (since it combines) and as matter (since it is part of the mixture).Empedocles Fr. 17 (Diels), 18-20. Now even if it so happens that the same thing is a principle both as matter and as causing motion, still the essence of the two principles is not the same. In which respect, then, is Love a principle? And it is also absurd that Strife should be imperishable; strife is the very essence of evil.Cf. Aristot. Met. 9.9.3.
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Anaxagoras makes the Good a principle as causing motion; for Mind moves things, but moves them for some end, and therefore there must be some other GoodMotion presupposes a final cause, which was not what Anaxagoras meant by Mind. Cf. Aristot. Met. 1.7.5.—unless it is as we say; for on our view the art of medicine is in a sense health.Aristotle identifies the efficient cause, in a sense, with the final cause. Cf. Aristot. Met. 7.9.3. It is absurd also not to provide a contrary for the Good, i.e. for Mind.In Aristot. Met. 1.6.10 Aristotle describes Anaxagoras as a recognizing contrary principles of good and evil. Moreover, on Aristotle’s own showing, evil cannot be a principle (Aristot. Met. 9.9.3). But all those who recognize the contraries fail to make use of the contraries, unless we systematize their theories.
