Kitap 12
5
All thinkers maintain that all things come from contraries; but they are wrong both in saying all thingsBecause there is an eternal substance, which is not derived from contraries (Aristot. Met. 12.6.1). and in saying that they come from contraries,Things are derived from a substrate as well (Aristot. Met. 12.2.1). nor do they explain how things in which the contraries really are present come from the contraries; for the contraries cannot act upon each other. For us, however, this problem is satisfactorily solved by the fact that there is a third factor. Other thinkers make one of the two contraries matter; e.g., this is done by thoseSee on Aristot. Met. 14.1.4. who make the Unequal matter for the Equal, or the Many matter for the One.
6
But this also is disposed of in the same way; for the one matter of two contraries is contrary to nothing. Further, on their view everything except Unity itself will partake of evil; for the BadThe Bad was identified with the unequal; cf. Aristot. Met. 1.6.10. is itself one of the elements. The other schoolSee Aristot. Met. 12.7.10 does not even regard the Good and the Bad as principles; yet the Good is in the truest sense a principle in all things. The former school is right in holding that the Good is a principle, but they do not explain how it is a principle— whether as an end or as a moving cause or as form.
