Kitap 11
6
Again, if there is a substance and principle of such a nature as that which we are now seeking, and if it is one for all things, i.e. the same for both eternal and perishable things, it is a difficult question as to why, when the principle is the same, some of the things which come under that principle are eternal, and others not; for this is paradoxical.Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.1.12, Aristot. Met. 3.4.11-23.
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But if there is one principle of perishable things, and another of eternal things, if the principle of perishable things is also eternal, we shall still have the same difficulty; because if the principle is eternal, why are not the things which come under that principle eternal? And if it is perishable, it must have another principle behind it, and that principle must have another behind it; and the process will go on to infinity.
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On the other hand, if we posit the principles which seem most unchangeable, Being and Unity,Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.1.13, Aristot. Met. 3.4.24-34.(a) unless each of them denotes a particular thing and a substance, how can they be separate and independent? but the eternal and primary principles for which we are looking are of this nature.
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(b) If, however, each of them denotes a particular thing and a substance, then all existing things are substances; for Being is predicated of everything, and Unity also of some things.
