Kitap 10
4
Such are the things of which the concept is one, i.e. of which the concept is indivisible; and this is indivisible when the object is indivisible (3.) in form or (4.) in number. Now in number the individual is indivisible, and in form that which is indivisible in comprehension and knowledge; so that that which causes the unity of substances must be one in the primary sense.
5
Such, then, in number are the meanings of one: the naturally continuous, the whole, the individual, and the universal. All these are one because they are indivisible; some in motion, and others in concept or formula. But we must recognize that the questions, What sort of things are called one? and What is essential unity, and what is the formula? must not be taken to be the same.
6
One has these several meanings, and each thing to which some one of these senses applies will be one; but essential unity will have now one of these senses and now something else, which is still nearer to the term one, whereas they are nearer to its denotation . This is also true of element and cause, supposing that one had to explain them both by exhibiting concrete examples and by giving a definition of the term.
