Kitap 1
34
On the other hand, assuming that this knowledge should turn out to be innate,Cf. the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις (recollection), Plat. Meno 81c, Plat. Phaedo 72e. it is astonishing that we should possess unawares the most important of the sciences. Further, how is one to know of what elements things consist? how is it to be established?
35
Even this presents a difficulty, because the facts might be disputed, as happens in the case of certain syllables—for some say that ZA is composed of S, D and A, while others say that it is a distinct sound and not any one of those which are familiar to us.στοιχεῖον means both an element and a letter of the alphabet; hence letters are often used as analogues of the material elements. The point here is: Is Z or rather the Greek ζ) a στοιχεῖον, or is it further analyzable? Since this can be disputed, we must expect differences of opinion about the elements in general.
36
Further, how can one gain knowledge of the objects of a particular sense-perception without possessing that sense? Yet it should be possible, that if the elements of which all things consist, as composite sounds consist of their peculiar Peculiar to them as sounds, not as individual sounds. If sights and sounds had the same elements, sight, which knows those elements as composing sights, would know them as composing sounds; i.e., we could see sounds. elements, are the same.
