Kitap 5
3
Therefore there is another sort of Injustice, which is a part of Injustice in the universal sense, and there is something unjust which is a part of the unjust in general, or illegal.
4
(2) Again, suppose two men to commit adultery, one for profit, and gaining by the act, the other from desire, and having to pay, and so losing by it: then the latter would be deemed to be a profligate rather than a man who takes more than his due, while the former would be deemed unjust, but not profligate; clearly therefore it is being done for profit that makes the action unjust.
5
(3) Again, whereas all other unjust acts are invariably ascribed to some particular vice—for example, adultery is put down to Profligacy, desertion from the ranks to Cowardice, assault to Anger—an unjust act by which a man has profited is not attributed to any vice except Injustice.
6
Hence it is manifest that there is another sort of Injustice besides universal Injustice, the former being a part of the latter. It is called by the same name because its definition falls in the same genus, both sorts of Injustice being exhibited in a man’s relation to others; but whereas Injustice in the particular sense is concerned with honor or money or security, or whatever term we may employ to include all these things, its motive being the pleasure of gain, Injustice in the universal sense is concerned with all the things that are the sphere of Virtue.
