Kitap 3
4
Also a man of defective self-restraint acts from desire but not from choice; and on the contrary a self-restrained man acts from choice and not from desire.
5
Again, desire can run counter to choice, but not desire to desire.i.e., you cannot feel two contradictory desires at once (though you can of course desire two incompatible things: you may want to eat your cake and have it; but you cannot strictly speaking at the same time both desire to eat the cake and desire not to eat it). But you can desire to do a thing and choose not to do it. And desire has regard to an object as pleasant or painful, choice has not.But as good or bad.
6
(2) Still less is choice the same as passion. Acts done from passion seem very far from being done of deliberate choice.
7
(3) Again, choice is certainly not a wish, though they appear closely akin. Choice cannot have for its object impossibilities: if a man were to say he chose something impossible he would be thought a fool; but we can wish for things that are impossible, for instance immortality.
8
Also we may wish for what cannot be secured by our own agency, for instance, that a particular actorGreek dramas were produced in competitions (and it is noteworthy that in the Old Comedy at Athens the play itself dramatized a contest or debate). or athlete may win; but no one chooses what does not rest with himself, but only what he thinks can be attained by his own act.
