Kitap 1
1
These questions being settled, let us consider whether happiness is one of the things we praise or rather one of those that we honorThe definition of happiness is now shown to be supported by the current terms of moral approbation; apparently ἐπαινετον, praiseworthy or commendable, was appropriate to means , or things having relative value, and τίμιον, valued or revered, to ends, or things of absolute value.; for it is at all events clear that it is not a mere potentiality.i.e., not merely a potentiality of good but an actual good, whether as means or end.
2
Now it appears that a thing which we praise is always praised because it has a certain quality and stands in a certain relation to something. For we praise just men and brave men, in fact good men and virtue generally, because of their actions and the results they produce; and also we praise those who are strong of body, swift of foot and the like on account of their possessing certain natural qualities, and standing in a certain relation to something good and excellent.
3
The point is also illustrated by our feeling about praises addressed to the gods: it strikes us as absurd that the gods should be referred to our standards, and this is what praising them amounts to, since praise, as we said, involves a reference of its object to something else.
