Kitap 7
29
Therefore since the primary sort of friendship is in accordance with goodness, friends of this sort will be absolutely good in themselves also, and this not because of being useful, but in another manner.
30
For good for a given person and good absolutely are twofold; and the same is the case with states of character as with profitableness—what is profitable absolutely and what is profitable for given persons are different things (just as taking exercise is a different thing from taking drugs). So the state of character called human goodness is of two kinds—
31
for let us assume that man is one of the things that are excellent by nature: consequently the goodness of a thing excellent by nature is good absolutely, but that of a thing not excellent by nature is only good for that thing.
32
The case of the pleasant also, therefore, is similar. For here we must pause and consider whether there is any friendship without pleasure,and how such a friendship differs from other friendship, and on which exactly of the two thingsGoodness and pleasantness. the affection depends—do we love a man because he is good even if he is not pleasant, but not because he is pleasant?Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give or not, but because he is pleasant. Then, affection having two meanings,Potential and actual (Solomon). does actual affection seem to involve pleasure because activity is good?
