Kitap 3
8
The proof of the formula is the same as in the other cases: wittiness of this kind (not the qualityViz. βωμολοχία, buffoonery, Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1128a 15. to which we apply the term in a transferred sense) is a very becoming sort of character, and also a middle state is praiseworthy, whereas extremes are blameworthy. But as there are two kinds of wit (one consisting in liking a joke, even one that tells against oneself if it is funny, for instance a jeer, the other in the ability to produce things of this sort), these kinds of wit differ from one another, but both are middle states;
9
for a man who can produce jokes of a sort that will give pleasure to a person of good judgement even though the laugh is against himself will be midway between the vulgar man and the frigid. This is a better definition than that the thing said must not be painful to the victim whatever sort of man he may be—rather, it must give pleasure to the man in the middle position, since his judgement is good.
10
All these middle states, though praiseworthy, are not virtues, nor are the opposite states vices, for they do not involve purposive choice; they are all in the classification of the emotions, for each of them is an emotion.
11
But because they are natural they contribute to the natural virtues; for, as will be said in what follows,Not in Eud. Eth, but cf. Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1144b 1-17. each virtue exists both naturally and otherwise, that is, in conjunction with thought.
