Kitap 2
5
And similarly it is manifest that purposive choice is not opinion either, nor something that one simply thinks; for we saw Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1223a 16-19. that a thing chosen is something in one’s own power, but we have opinions as to many things that do not depend on us, for instance that the diagonal of a square is incommensurableThe Mss. give commensurable, but there is no point in specifying an untrue opinion. Cf. Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1112a 22περὶ δὴ τῶν ἀϊδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου, ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι (where Kb has σύμμετροι). with the side;
6
and again, choice is not true or false. Nor yet is purposive choice an opinion about practicable things within one’s own power that makes us think that we ought to do or not to do something; but this characteristic is common to opinion and to wish.
7
For no one purposively chooses any End, but the means to his End—I mean for instance no one chooses to be healthy, but to take a walk or sit down for the sake of being healthy, no one chooses to be well off, but to go into business or to speculate for the sake of being well off; and generally, one who makes a choice always makes it clear both what his choice is and what its object is, object meaning that for the sake of which he chooses something else and choice meaning that which he chooses for the sake of something else.
