Kitap 2
1
Also it is clear from the following considerations that voluntary action does not mean acting in accordance with purposive choice. It was provedOr, altering the text, It was proved not that acting in accordance with one’s wishes is the same thing as acting voluntarily, but rather that all one wishes is also voluntary although it is possible to act voluntarily without wishing—this is all that has been proved; but many things that we wish— that acting in accordance with one’s wish is not acting involuntarily, but rather everything that one wishes is also voluntary—it has only been proved that it is possible to do a thing voluntarily without wishing; but many things that we wish we do suddenly, whereas nobody makes a purposive choice suddenly.
2
But if as we saidCf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1223a 23ff. the voluntary must necessarily be one of three things—what is in conformity with appetition, or with purposive choice, or with thought—, and if it is not the two former, it remains that voluntariness consists in acting with some kind of thought.
3
Moreover, let us put a conclusion to our delimitation of the voluntary and involuntary by carrying the thought argument a little further. Acting under compulsion and not under compulsion seem to be terms akin to the ones mentioned; for we say that everything forced is involuntary and everything involuntary is forced. So we must first consider the exact meaning of forced, and how what is forced is related to the voluntary and involuntary.
