Kitap 2
3
But moreover there are three subdivisions of appetition—wish, passion and desire; so that we have to distinguish these. And first we must consider conformity with desire.
4
It would seem that everything that conforms with desire is voluntary. For everything involuntary seems to be forced, and what is forced and everything that people do or suffer under necessity is painful, as indeed Evenus says: For all necessity doth cause distress— Evenus of Paros = Theog. 472 Quoted also Aristot. Met. 1015a 28 and Aristot. Rhet.1370a 10, and = Theognidea 472 (but that has χρῆμ’ ἀνιαρόν); probably by the elder Evenus of Paros, fl. 460 B.C. (Bowra, Cl. Rev. 48.2).
5
so that if a thing is painful it is forced and if a thing is forced it is painful; but everything contrary to desire is painful (for desire is for what is pleasant), so that it is forced and involuntary. Therefore what conforms with desire is voluntary, for things contrary to and things in conformity with desire are opposite to one another.
