Kitap 2
1
But since it has been assumedSee 1218b 37 ff. that goodness is a state of character of a sort that causes men to be capable of doing the best actions and gives them the best disposition in regard to the greatest good, and the best and greatest good is that which is in accordance with right principle, and this is the mean between excess and deficiency relative to ourselves, it would necessarily follow that moral goodness corresponds with each particular middle state and is concerned with certain mean points in pleasures and pains and pleasant and painful things.
2
And this middle state will sometimes be in pleasures (for even in these there is excess and deficiency), sometimes in pains, sometimes in both. For he that exceeds in feeling delight exceeds in the pleasant, and he that exceeds in feeling pain exceeds in the opposite—and this whether his feelings are excessive absolutely or excessive in relation to some standard, for instance are felt more than ordinary men feel them; whereas the good man feels in the proper way.—
3
And since there is a certain state of character which results in its possessor’s being in one instance such as to accept an excess and in another such as to accept a deficiency of the same thing,it follows that as these actions are contrary to each other and to the mean, so also the states of character that cause them are contrary to each other and to virtue.
