895–896
Athenian
Ath. Now stop a moment, in Heaven’s name! Would you not desire to observe three points about every object?
Clinias
Clin. What do you mean?
Athenian
Ath. One point is the substance, one the definition of the substance, and one the name;Cp. Epistles 7, 342 A, B. and, moreover, about everything that exists there are two questions to be asked.
15
Athenian
Ath. At one time each of us, propounding the name by itself, demands the definition; at another, propounding the definition by itself, he demands the name.
Clinias
Clin. Is it something of this kind we mean now to convey?
Athenian
Ath. Of what kind?
Clinias
Clin. We have instances of a thing divisible into two halves, both in arithmetic and elsewhere; in arithmetic the name of this is the even, and the definition is a number divisible into two equal parts.
20
Athenian
Ath. Yes, that is what I mean. So in either case it is the same object, is it not, which we describe, whether, when asked for the definition, we reply by giving the name, or, when asked for the name, we give the definition,—describing one and the same object by the name even, and by the definition a number divisible into two halves?
Clinias
Clin. Most certainly.
Athenian
Ath. What is the definition of that object which has for its name soul? Can we give it any other definition than that stated just now—the motion able to move itself?
Clinias
Clin. Do you assert that self-movement is the definition of that very same substance which has soul as the name we universally apply to it?