859–860
Athenian
Ath. In respect of goodness and justice as a whole, let us try to discern this,—how far we now agree with ourselves, and how far we differ (for we should certainly say that we desire, if nothing else, to differ at least from the majority of men), and how far also the majority agree or differ among themselves.
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Clinias
Clin. What differences of ours have you in mind?
Athenian
Ath. I will try to explain. Concerning justice in general, and men, things, or actions that are just, we all agree that these are all beautiful, so that no one would be regarded as saying what was wrong even if he should maintain that just men, however ugly in body, are quite beautiful in respect of their very just character.
Clinias
Clin. Would not that be right?
Athenian
Ath. Perhaps; but let us observe this,—that if all things which belong to justice are beautiful, that all includes for us passionsi.e. sufferings. nearly as much as actions.
Clinias
Clin. Well, what then?
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Athenian
Ath. Every just action, in so far as it shares in justice, practically in the same degree partakes of beauty.
Athenian
Ath. It is agreed also—if our argument is to be consistent— that a passion which shares in justice, becomes, so far, beautiful.
Athenian
Ath. But if we agree that a passion though just is unseemly, then justice and beauty will be at discord, when just things are called most unseemly.
Clinias
Clin. What do you mean by that?
Athenian
Ath. It is not hard to grasp. The laws we enacted a short time ago might seem to enjoin what is absolutely contrary to our present statements.
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