696–697
Athenian
Ath. Nor is he whom we recently proposedCp. Plat. Laws 689d. as our type of wisdom,—the man who has his feelings of pleasure and pain in accord with the dictates of right reason and obedient thereto.
Megillus
Meg. No, indeed.
Athenian
Ath. Here is a further point we must consider, in order to judge about the conferment of honors in States, when they are right and when wrong.
Megillus
Meg. What point?
Athenian
Ath. If temperance existed alone in a man’s soul, divorced from all the rest of virtue, would it justly be held in honor or the reverse?
15
Megillus
Meg. I cannot tell what reply to make.
Athenian
Ath. Yet, in truth, you have made a reply, and a reasonable one. For if you had declared for either of the alternatives in my question, you would have said what is, to my mind, quite out of tune.
Megillus
Meg. So it has turned out to be all right.
Athenian
Ath. Very good. Accordingly, the additional element in objects deserving of honor or dishonor will be one that demands not speech so much as a kind of speechless silence.i.e., temperance, regarded as merely an adjunct to civic merit, requires no further discussion at this point.
Megillus
Meg. I suppose you mean temperance.
20
Athenian
Ath. Yes. And of the rest, that which, with the addition of temperance, benefits us most would best deserve to be held in the highest honor, and the second in degree of benefit put second in order of honor; and so with each of the others in succession—to each it will be proper to assign the honor due to its rank.