230
Socrates
Soc. And so with drink and every other class of things that exist, when some things in any class come to be good, and others evil, one thing does not differ from another in that respect whereby they are the same? For instance, one man, I suppose, is virtuous, and another wicked.
Socrates
Soc. But neither of them, I conceive, is more or less man than the other—neither the virtuous than the wicked, nor the wicked than the virtuous.
Friend
Fr. What you say is true.
15
Socrates
Soc. Then are we to take the same view of gain also, that both the wicked and the virtuous sort are similarly gain?
Socrates
Soc. So he who has virtuous gain is no whit the more a gainer than he who has wicked gain: neither sort is found to be more gain, as we agree.
Socrates
Soc. For neither of them has addition of either more or less.
20
Socrates
Soc. And how could one do or suffer anything more or less with a thing of this sort, that had neither of these additions?
Socrates
Soc. Since, therefore, both of these are gains and gain-making affairs, we must now consider what it can be that leads you to call both of them gain: what is it that you see to be the same in both? Suppose you were to ask me, in those instances that I gave just now, what it is that leads me to call both good food and evil food alike food, I should tell you— for this reason, because both are a dry sustenance of the body. For that, I am sure you would agree, is what food is, would you not?
