261–262
Socrates
Socrates. Then he whose speaking is an art will make the same thing appear to the same persons at one time just and at another, if he wishes, unjust?
Phaedrus
Phaedrus. Certainly.
Socrates
Socrates. And in political speaking he will make the same things seem to the State at one time good and at another the opposite?
Phaedrus
Phaedrus. Just so.
15
Socrates
Socrates. Do we not know that the Eleatic Palamedes (Zeno) has such an art of speaking that the same things appear to his hearers to be alike and unlike, one and many, stationary and in motion?
Phaedrus
Phaedrus. Certainly.
Socrates
Socrates. Then the art of contention in speech is not confined to courts and political gatherings, but apparently, if it is an art at all, it would be one and the same in all kinds of speaking, the art by which a man will be able to produce a resemblance between all things between which it can be produced, and to bring to the light the resemblances produced and disguised by anyone else.
Phaedrus
Phaedrus. What do you mean by that?
Socrates
Socrates. I think it will be plain if we examine the matter in this way. Is deception easier when there is much difference between things or when there is little?
20
Phaedrus
Phaedrus. When there is little.
Socrates
Socrates. And if you make a transition by small steps from anything to its opposite you will be more likely to escape detection than if you proceed by leaps and bounds.
Phaedrus
Phaedrus. Of course.
Socrates
Socrates. Then he who is to deceive another, and is not to be deceived himself, must know accurately the similarity and dissimilarity of things.
Phaedrus
Phaedrus. Yes, he must.
5
