259–260
Socrates
Socrates. If a speech is to be good, must not the mind of the speaker know the truth about the matters of which he is to speak?
Phaedrus
Phaedrus. On that point, Socrates, I have heard that one who is to be an orator does not need to know what is really just, but what would seem just to the multitude who are to pass judgment, and not what is really good or noble, but what will seem to be so; for they say that persuasion comes from what seems to be true, not from the truth.
Socrates
Socrates. Phaedrus, The word,which the wise speak must not be rejected, but we must see if they are right; so we must not pass by this which you just said.
Phaedrus
Phaedrus. You are right.
Socrates
Socrates. Let us then examine it in this way.
Phaedrus
Phaedrus. How?
5
Socrates
Socrates. If I should urge you to buy a horse and fight against the invaders, and neither of us knew what a horse was, but I merely knew this about you, that Phaedrus thinks a horse is the one of the tame animals which has the longest ears—
Phaedrus
Phaedrus. It would be ridiculous, Socrates.
Socrates
Socrates. No, not yet; but if I tried to persuade you in all seriousness, composing a speech in praise of the ass, which I called a horse, and saying that the beast was a most valuable possession at home and in war, that you could use him as a mount in battle, and that he was able to carry baggage and was useful for many other purposes—
Phaedrus
Phaedrus. Then it would be supremely ridiculous.
Socrates
Socrates. But is it not better to be ridiculous than to be clever and an enemy?
10
Phaedrus
Phaedrus. To be sure.
