66–67
Socrates
Soc. And fifth, those pleasures which we separated and classed as painless, which we called pure pleasures of the soul itself, those which accompany knowledge and, sometimes, perceptions?
10
Socrates
Soc. But with the sixth generation, says Orpheus, cease the rhythmic song. It seems that our discussion, too, is likely to cease with the sixth decision. So after this nothing remains for us but to give our discussion a sort of head.
Protarchus
Pro. Yes, that should be done.
Socrates
Soc. Come then, let us for the third time call the same argument to witness before Zeus the saviour, and proceed.
Protarchus
Pro. What argument?
15
Socrates
Soc. Philebus declared that pleasure was entirely and in all respects the good.
Protarchus
Pro. Apparently, Socrates, when you said the third time just now, you meant that we must take up our argument again from the beginning.
Socrates
Soc. Yes; but let us hear what follows. For I, perceiving the truths which I have now been detailing, and annoyed by the theory held not only by Philebus but by many thousands of others, said that mind was a far better and more excellent thing for human life than pleasure.
Socrates
Soc. But suspecting that there were many other things to be considered, I said that if anything should be found better than these two, I should support mind against pleasure in the struggle for the second place, and even the second place would be lost by pleasure.
20
Protarchus
Pro. Yes, that is what you said.
Socrates
Soc. And next it was most sufficiently proved that each of these two was insufficient.
Protarchus
Pro. Very true.
