42
Socrates
Soc. Well then, in the case of sight, seeing things from too near at hand or from too great a distance obscures their real sizes and causes us to have false opinions; and does not this same thing happen in the case of pains and pleasures?
Protarchus
Pro. Yes, Socrates, even much more than in the case of sight.
Socrates
Soc. Then our present conclusion is the opposite of what we said a little while ago.
Protarchus
Pro. To what do you refer?
Socrates
Soc. A while ago these opinions, being false or true, imbued the pains and pleasures with their own condition of truth or falsehood.
5
Protarchus
Pro. Very true.
Socrates
Soc. But now, because they are seen at various and changing distances and are compared with one another, the pleasures themselves appear greater and more intense by comparison with the pains, and the pains in turn, through comparison with the pleasures, vary inversely as they.
Protarchus
Pro. That is inevitable for the reasons you have given.
Socrates
Soc. They both, then, appear greater and less than the reality. Now if you abstract from both of them this apparent, but unreal, excess or inferiority, you cannot say that its appearance is true, nor again can you have the face to affirm that the part of pleasure or pain which corresponds to this is true or real.
Protarchus
Pro. No, I cannot.
10
Socrates
Soc. Next, then, we will see whether we may not in another direction come upon pleasures and pains still more false than these appearing and existing in living beings.
Protarchus
Pro. What pleasures and what method do you mean?
