40–41
Socrates
Soc. I mean that he who feels pleasure at all in any way or manner always really feels pleasure, but it is sometimes not based upon realities, whether present or past, and often, perhaps most frequently, upon things which will never even be realities in the future.
Protarchus
Pro. This also, Socrates, must inevitably be the case.
Socrates
Soc. And the same may be said of fear and anger and all that sort of thing—that they are all sometimes false?
25
Protarchus
Pro. Certainly.
Socrates
Soc. Well, can we say that opinions become bad or good except as they become false?
Socrates
Soc. And we understand, I believe, that pleasures also are not bad except by being false.
Protarchus
Pro. No; you have said quite the reverse of the truth, Socrates; for no one would be at all likely to call pains and pleasures bad because they are false, but because they are involved in another great and manifold evil.
Socrates
Soc. Then of the evil pleasures which are such because of evil we will speak a little later, if we still care to do so; but of the false pleasures we must prove in another way that they exist and come into existence in us often and in great numbers; for this may help us to reach our decisions.
Protarchus
Pro. Yes, of course; that is, if such pleasures exist.
Socrates
Soc. But they do exist, Protarchus, in my opinion; however, until we have established the truth of this opinion, it cannot be unquestioned.
Socrates
Soc. Then let us, like athletes, approach and grapple with this new argument.
Protarchus
Pro. Let us do so.
