36–37
Socrates
Soc. But, Protarchus, how can there be true and false fears, or true and false expectations, or true and false opinions?
Protarchus
Pro. Opinions I would grant you, but not the rest.
Socrates
Soc. What? I am afraid we are starting a very considerable discussion.
Protarchus
Pro. You are right.
20
Socrates
Soc. And yet we must consider, thou son of that man, Son of that man may mean son of Philebus, in so far as Protarchus is a pupil of Philebus, or (so Bury) son of Gorgias, the orator and teacher (cf. Plat. Phaedo 58b), or the father of Protarchus may be referred to by the pronoun, possibly because Socrates does not at the moment recall his name or because he wishes to imply that he was a man of mark. whether the discussion is relevant to what has gone before.
Protarchus
Pro. Yes, no doubt.
Socrates
Soc. We must dismiss everything else, tedious or otherwise, that is irrelevant.
Socrates
Soc. Now tell me; for I am always utterly amazed by the same questions we were just proposing.
25
Protarchus
Pro. What do you mean?
Socrates
Soc. Are not some pleasures false and others true?
Protarchus
Pro. How could that be?
Socrates
Soc. Then, as you maintain, nobody, either sleeping or waking or insane or deranged, ever thinks he feels pleasure when he does not feel it, and never, on the other hand, thinks he suffers pain when he does not suffer it?
Protarchus
Pro. We have, Socrates, always believed that all this is as you suggest.
30
Socrates
Soc. But is the belief correct? Shall we consider whether it is so or not?
Protarchus
Pro. I should say we ought to consider that.
