33–34
Socrates
Soc. Shall we be right in saying that the soul forgets those which do not permeate both, and does not forget those which do?
Protarchus
Pro. Yes, certainly.
20
Socrates
Soc. Do not in the least imagine that when I speak of forgetting I mean that forgetfulness arises in this case; for forgetfulness is the departure of memory, and in the case under consideration memory has not yet come into being; now it is absurd to speak of the loss of that which does not exist and has not yet come into being, is it not?
Protarchus
Pro. Certainly.
Socrates
Soc. Then just change the terms.
Socrates
Soc. Instead of saying that the soul forgets, when it is unaffected by the vibrations of the body, apply the term want of perception to that which you are now calling forgetfulness.
Protarchus
Pro. I understand.
Socrates
Soc. And the union of soul and body in one common affection and one common motion you may properly call perception.
Protarchus
Pro. Very true.
Socrates
Soc. Then do we now understand what we mean by perception?
5
Protarchus
Pro. Certainly.
Socrates
Soc. I think, then, that memory may rightly be defined as the preservation of perception.
Protarchus
Pro. Quite rightly.
Socrates
Soc. But do we not say that memory differs from recollection?
Protarchus
Pro. Perhaps.
10
Socrates
Soc. And is this the difference?
Socrates
Soc. When the soul alone by itself, apart from the body, recalls completely any experience it has had in company with the body, we say that it recollects do we not?
Protarchus
Pro. Certainly.
