Φίληβος

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İngilizce Yunanca

22

Socrates

Soc. How about the combined life, Protarchus, made up by a union of the two?

Protarchus

Pro. You mean a union of pleasure with mind or wisdom?

Socrates

Soc. Yes, I mean a union of such elements.

Protarchus

Pro. Every one will prefer this life to either of the two others—yes, every single person without exception.

Socrates

Soc. Then do we understand the consequences of what we are now saying? 5

Protarchus

Pro. Certainly. Three lives have been proposed, and of two of them neither is sufficient or desirable for man or any other living being.

Socrates

Soc. Then is it not already clear that neither of these two contained the good for if it did contain the good, it would be sufficient and perfect, and such as to be chosen by all living creatures which would be able to live thus all their lives; and if any of us chose anything else, he would be choosing contrary to the nature of the truly desirable, not of his own free will, but from ignorance or some unfortunate necessity.

Protarchus

Pro. That seems at any rate to be true.

Socrates

Soc. And so I think we have sufficiently proved that Philebus’s divinity is not to be considered identical with the good.

Philebus

Phi. But neither is your mind the good, Socrates; it will be open to the same objections. 10