250–251
Stranger
Str. There is nothing left, I think, to which he can turn easily. For if a thing is not in motion, it must surely be at rest; and again, what is not at rest, must surely be in motion. But now we find that being has emerged outside of both these classes. Is that possible, then?
Theaetetus
Theaet. No, nothing could be more impossible.
Stranger
Str. Then there is this further thing which we ought to remember.
Theaetetus
Theaet. What is it?
Stranger
Str. That when we were asked to what the appellation of not-being should be applied, we were in the greatest perplexity. Do you remember?
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Theaetetus
Theaet. Of course I do.
Stranger
Str. Well, then, are we now in any less perplexity about being?
Theaetetus
Theaet. It seems to me, stranger, that we are, if possible, in even greater.
Stranger
Str. This point, then, let us put down definitely as one of complete perplexity. But since being and not-being participate equally in the perplexity, there is now at last some hope that as either of them emerges more dimly or more clearly, so also will the other emerge. If, however, we are able to see neither of them, we will at any rate push our discussion through between both of them at once as creditably as we can.
Stranger
Str. Let us, then, explain how we come to be constantly calling this same thing by many names.
Theaetetus
Theaet. What, for instance? Please give an example.
