Σοφιστής

Bölümler

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İngilizce Yunanca

249

Stranger

Str. Then shall we say that it has mind and life and soul, but, although endowed with soul, is absolutely immovable?

Theaetetus

Theaet. All those things seem to me absurd.

Stranger

Str. And it must be conceded that motion and that which is moved exist.

Theaetetus

Theaet. Of course. 10

Stranger

Str. Then the result is, Theaetetus, that if there is no motion, there is no mind in anyone about anything anywhere.

Theaetetus

Theaet. Exactly.

Stranger

Str. And on the other hand, if we admit that all things are in flux and motion, we shall remove mind itself from the number of existing things by this theory also.

Theaetetus

Theaet. How so?

Stranger

Str. Do you think that sameness of quality or nature or relations could ever come into existence without the state of rest? 15

Theaetetus

Theaet. Not at all.

Stranger

Str. What then? Without these can you see how mind could exist or come into existence anywhere?

Theaetetus

Theaet. By no means.

Stranger

Str. And yet we certainly must contend by every argument against him who does away with knowledge or reason or mind and then makes any dogmatic assertion about anything.

Theaetetus

Theaet. Certainly. 20