237–238
Stranger
Str. And this is plain to us, that we always use the word something of some being, for to speak of something in the abstract, naked, as it were, and disconnected from all beings is impossible, is it not?
Theaetetus
Theaet. Yes, it is.
Stranger
Str. You assent because you recognize that he who says something must say some one thing?
Theaetetus
Theaet. Yes.
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Stranger
Str. And you will agree that something or some in the singular is the sign of one, in the dual of two, and in the plural of many.
Theaetetus
Theaet. Of course.
Stranger
Str. And he who says not something, must quite necessarily say absolutely nothing.
Theaetetus
Theaet. Quite necessarily.
Stranger
Str. Then we cannot even concede that such a person speaks, but says nothing? We must even declare that he who undertakes to say not-being does not speak at all?
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Theaetetus
Theaet. The argument could go no further in perplexity.
Stranger
Str. Boast not too soon! For there still remains, my friend, the first and greatest of perplexities. It affects the very beginning of the matter.
Theaetetus
Theaet. What do you mean? Do not hesitate to speak.
Stranger
Str. To that which is may be added or attributed some other thing which is?
Theaetetus
Theaet. Of course.
Stranger
Str. But shall we assert that to that which is not anything which is can be attributed?
5
Theaetetus
Theaet. Certainly not.
Stranger
Str. Now we assume that all number is among the things which are.
Theaetetus
Theaet. Yes, if anything can be assumed to be.
Stranger
Str. Then let us not even undertake to attribute either the singular or the plural of number to not-being.
Theaetetus
Theaet. We should, apparently, not be right in undertaking that, as our argument shows.
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