188–189
Socrates
SOC. Yet surely if a man sees any one thing, he sees something that is. Or do you, perhaps, think one is among the things that are not?
25
Theaetetus
THEAET. No, I do not.
Socrates
SOC. Then he who sees any one thing, sees something that is.
Theaetetus
THEAET. That is clear.
Socrates
SOC. And therefore he who hears anything, hears some one thing and therefore hears what is.
Socrates
SOC. And he who touches anything, touches some one thing, which is, since it is one?
Theaetetus
THEAET. That also is true.
Socrates
SOC. So, then, does not he who holds an opinion hold an opinion of some one thing?
5
Theaetetus
THEAET. He must do so.
Socrates
SOC. And does not he who holds an opinion of some one thing hold an opinion of something that is?
Theaetetus
THEAET. I agree.
Socrates
SOC. Then he who holds an opinion of what is not holds an opinion of nothing.
Theaetetus
THEAET. Evidently.
10
Socrates
SOC. Well then, he who holds an opinion of nothing, holds no opinion at all.
Theaetetus
THEAET. That is plain, apparently.
Socrates
SOC. Then it is impossible to hold an opinion of that which is not, either in relation to things that are, or independently of them.
Theaetetus
THEAET. Evidently.
Socrates
SOC. Then holding false opinion is something different from holding an opinion of that which is not?
15
Theaetetus
THEAET. So it seems.
