186–187
Socrates
SOC. By which, we say, we are quite unable to apprehend truth, since we cannot apprehend being, either.
Theaetetus
THEAET. No; certainly not.
Socrates
SOC. Nor knowledge either, then.
Socrates
SOC. Then, Theaetetus, perception and knowledge could never be the same.
30
Theaetetus
THEAET. Evidently not, Socrates; and indeed now at last it has been made perfectly clear that knowledge is something different from perception.
Socrates
SOC. But surely we did not begin our conversation in order to find out what knowledge is not, but what it is. However, we have progressed so far, at least, as not to seek for knowledge in perception at all, but in some function of the soul, whatever name is given to it when it alone and by itself is engaged directly with realities.
Theaetetus
THEAET. That, Socrates, is, I suppose, called having opinion.
Socrates
SOC. You suppose rightly, my friend. Now begin again at the beginning. Wipe out all we said before, and see if you have any clearer vision, now that you have advanced to this point. Say once more what knowledge is.
Theaetetus
THEAET. To say that all opinion is knowledge is impossible, Socrates, for there is also false opinion; but true opinion probably is knowledge. Let that be my answer. For if it is proved to be wrong as we proceed, I will try to give another, just as I have given this.
